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I. THIS ARTICLE AND CHARLEY GALVIN
I have long admired Charley Galvin as a prominent, fearless, and con-
sistent advocate of sound tax policy. Consequently, I was delighted
when Chris Hanna asked me to participate in this symposium. It is
surely appropriate for the SMU Law Review to recognize Charley's ex-
emplary service to the American tax system, and I am pleased to be part
of the exercise.
In addition, my participation has a personal element. A major reason
for the topic of this piece is that in 1993, Charley asked me to appear
before an ABA Tax Section Committee that he chaired to discuss the
simplification properties of consumption tax regimes. That opportunity
led to a 1995 article,1 which was the beginning of my serious thinking
about consumption taxation as an alternative to the federal income tax.
Thus, if I were to participate in this symposium, it seemed appropriate for
my contribution to involve a consumption tax theme.
Unfortunately, Chris's invitation came when I had already obligated
110% of myself to other projects and, therefore, could only respond with
an incomplete product. After full disclosure, Chris said he wanted the
piece anyway, but readers should know that this article needs additional
development before it can be more than a "preliminary thoughts" piece,
and many more dense footnotes are required before it satisfies the cur-
rent fashion in law review publications. Thus, I put it forward as only a
tentative product, 2 but such as it is, here it is for Charley.
II. INTRODUCTION
This article deals with postpaid consumption taxes 3 as complete
1. J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Scoping Out the Uncertain Simplification (Complication?)
Effects of VATs, BATs and Consumed Income Taxes, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 390 (1995). For
Charley's response, see Charles 0. Galvin, A Consumed Income World-The Low Income
and Prospects for Simplification-Replies to Professors Fleming and Yin, 2 FLA. TAX REV.
552 (1995).
2. Comments from readers to flemingc@lawgate.byu.edu will be welcomed.
3. "Postpaid consumption tax" means that savings, and the yield thereon, are left out
of the tax base until spent on consumption. Thus, taxation is postpaid in the sense that tax
is not levied when the taxpayer's wealth increases, but instead is deferred until wealth is
consumed. Retail sales taxes, value added taxes, and cash-flow consumption taxes are
postpaid consumption taxes. A wage tax, by contrast, is a prepaid consumption tax. See
generally PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-
GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM 90 (2005), available at http://
www.taxreformpanel.gov/final-report/TaxReform-ch5.pdf [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S ADVi-
SORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM]; Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understanding of Tax,
103 MICH. L. REV. 807, 813, 820-21, 824-25, 829 (2005); Fleming, supra note 1, at 392-93.
[Vol. 59
Postpaid Consumption Tax
replacements for the federal income tax. Supplementing the federal in-
come tax with a consumption tax that raises sufficient revenue to permit a
greatly enlarged standard deduction, thereby removing large numbers of
low and middle income individuals from the income tax system, is a dif-
ferent matter, that is not addressed in this piece. 4
In recent years, proposals have been made to replace the federal in-
come tax with a postpaid consumption tax-that is, a federal value added
tax ("VAT"), a federal retail sales tax ("RST"), or a federal cash-flow
(consumed income) tax.5 Because these taxes can be constructed so that
they are indistinguishable at the level of the ultimate consumer in terms
of their principal effects, 6 and because a prominent recent proposal is the
RST approach, 7 I have written this article in terms of an RST/income tax
comparison. The analysis, however, would be mostly the same if the in-
come tax was compared with the other forms of postpaid consumption
taxes.8
Commentators and analysts have often noted that complete replace-
ment of the federal income tax with a consumption tax regime would
4. This approach is explained in ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., POLICY
BRIEF: ECONOMIC SURVEY OF THE UNITED STATES, 2005, at 4 (Oct. 2005), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/11/35541272.pdf; Michael J. Graetz, A Fair and Balanced
Tax System for the Twenty-First Century, in TOWARD FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 48, 56
(Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin A. Hassett eds., 2005); Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unneces-
sary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax System, 112 YALE L.J. 261, 282-86 (2002); and
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE U.S. INCOME TAX 262-66 (1999). But see Deborah A. Geier,
Incremental Versus Fundamental Tax Reform and the Top One Percent, 56 SMU L. REV. 99,
162-68 (2003) (rejecting the use of a consumption tax to supplement the federal income tax
to allow an enlarged standard deduction as politically unstable); Daniel S. Goldberg, The
U.S. Consumption Tax: Evolution, Not Revolution, 57 TAX LAW. 1, 31 (2003) (suggesting
that political pressure would cause the rates in the income tax component of this approach
to become confiscatory). See also PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM,
supra note 3, at 191-92 (describing a proposal for adoption of a federal value added tax to
allow reduced rates under a reformed income tax); COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., A NEW TAX
FRAMEWORK: A BLUEPRINT FOR AVERTING A FISCAL CRISIS 24-26 (2005), available at
http://www.ced.org/docs/report/report-tax2005.pdf [hereinafter A NEW TAX FRAMEWORK]
(arguing for adoption of a federal VAT as a supplement to the federal income tax for the
purpose of meeting projected revenue needs); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Risk, Rents, and
Regressivity: Why the United States Needs Both an Income Tax and a VAT, 105 TAX NOTES
1651 (2004) (arguing the same).
5. For a summary of recent proposals, see JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING
OURSELVES 7-8 (3d ed. 2004); Patricia Verbeek, Will a VAT Work in the United States?, 38
TAX NOTES INT'L 889, 894-95 (2005). But see PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX
REFORM, supra note 3, at 192, 207-09 (rejecting such proposals).
6. See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, supra note 3, at 37-40,
152-54, 209; 1 U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY AND Eco-
NOMIC GROWTH 213-16 (1984); JOSEPH M. DODGE, J. CLIFTON FLEMING, JR., & DEBORAH
A. GEIER, FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, AND POLICY 19-20, 68-73 (3d
ed. 2004); LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYm OF OWNERSHIP, 99-101 (2002);
SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 5, at 233-42; David F. Bradford, What Are Consumption
Taxes and Who Pays Them?, 39 TAX NOTES 383, 384-88 (1988); Michael J. Graetz, Imple-
menting a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1575, 1579 (1979).
7. See Heidi Glenn, Year in Review: Congress Targets ETI Repeal and More in 2004,
106 TAX NOTES 34, 38 (2005); Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: The Rise and Fall of
the National Sales Tax, 105 TAX NOTES 916, 916 (2004).
8. See generally authorities cited at supra note 6. For one instance in which the form
of postpaid consumption tax might make a difference, see infra part XVII.
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cause a substantial downward shifting of the federal tax burden to low
and middle income taxpayers.9 This article, however, does not deal with
that important point. Instead, it argues that complete replacement would
create an unlimited federal obligation to make a tax-rate-prescribed
match of all private saving, regardless of the amount or purpose of that
saving and regardless of the saver's income level. This argument also pro-
duces a new lens through which to examine postpaid consumption taxes.
Using that lens, the discussion re-examines familiar matters that are gen-
erally related to the debate over whether investment income is taxed
once under a comprehensive income tax and not at all under a postpaid
consumption tax, or is taxed twice under a comprehensive income tax and
once under a postpaid consumption tax.
III. THE INITIAL QUESTIONS
Let us begin with an example that illustrates the familiar difference in
the outcomes of an income tax and a postpaid consumption tax.
Example 1. Cole, a well-known legal scholar who is on the road for
long periods participating in various conferences, earns $100 of
wages on January 1, Year 1. He immediately uses these wages, after
any applicable tax, to buy a bluechip corporate debenture that will
pay him the principal plus 5% interest on January 1, Year 2. On that
date, Cole spends the cash proceeds from the debenture to buy flow-
ers for Louise, his wife, as partial penance for his frequent and
lengthy absences. Assume that the debenture's 5% interest rate
equals the return on riskless investments.10 To work out the tax con-
sequences of this example, alternately hypothesize that the United
States Government is financed exclusively by (1) a 30% income tax
(i.e. both labor income and realized 1 capital income are taxed), or
(2) a 30% retail sales tax, (that is, only retail consumption expendi-
tures are taxed). Finally, to simplify matters, assume that each tax is
imposed when the relevant taxable event occurs-that is, when in-
9. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMPREHENSIVE
TAx REFORM ch. 2 (1997), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/Oxx/doc36/taxrefor.pdf;
SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 5, at 256-64.
10. My intention is to have Cole earn interest at a rate equal to the riskless rate of
return. Commentators have disagreed on that rate with their conclusions ranging from less
than 1% to 5%. Compare Daniel Shaviro, Replacing the Income Tax with a Progressive
Consumption Tax, 103 TAX NOTES 91, 101 (2004), with Joseph Bankman & Barbara Fried,
Winners and Losers in the Shift to a Consumption Tax, 86 GEO. L.J. 539, 542 n. 10, (1998).
See also SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 5, at 334 n.6; Avi-Yonah, supra note 4, at 1656
(1.5% to 3.3%). I take no position on that matter, but have chosen 5% to generate num-
bers in Table 1 and other examples that are sufficiently large to provide useful illustrations.
The significance, if any, of limiting Cole to the riskless rate of return will be discussed in
infra part XVI.
11. A pure Schanz-Haig-Simons income tax would take unrealized gains and losses
into account. See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, supra note 3, at
20. But even Henry Simons, the most prominent popularizer of this form of tax, conceded
that the realization requirement is an inevitable feature of a workable income tax. See
HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 100, 207-08 (1938); see also William D.
Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1113, 1141-48 (1974).
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come is realized and when a retail purchase is made. Table 1 shows
the results:
TABLE 1
Retail Sales Tax
Income Tax (RST)
1/1/1 Wages $100.00 $100.00
1/1/1 Tax @ 30% -30.00 -0-
1/1/1 After-tax Investment $ 70.00 $100.00
Interest earned @ 5% +3.50 +5.00
1/1/2 30% income tax -1.05 -0-
Gross 1/1/2 amount for consumption $ 72.45 $105.00
1/1/2 30% RST on flower purchase -0- -31.5012
Net 1/1/2 consumption $ 72.45 $ 73.50
Note that the difference between the $72.45 Cole can spend on flowers
in the income tax scenario and the $73.50 available to him in the RST
scenario is the $1.05 tax on the Year 2 interest that is collected under the
income tax regime. In other words, Cole has more available for Year 2
consumption in the RST scenario, and the "more" equals the Year 2 in-
come tax on the $3.50 of interest that was received in the income tax
scenario.
Some would argue that unlike an income tax, postpaid consumption
taxes do not reach riskless returns to capital and that Table 1 merely con-
12. Actually, RSTs usually calculate the tax on an "add-on" or "tax exclusive" basis.
Thus, to achieve the $31.50 tax in the RST column of Table 1 under the usual approach for
administering an RST, the price of the flowers would be $73.50 and the RST rate would be
42.857% ($73.50 x .42857 = $31.50). See President's Advisory Panel on Fed. Tax Reform,
supra, note 3, at 208; Shaviro, supra note 10, at 93-94; SLEMROD AND BAKIJA, supra note 5,
at 242. But RSTs needn't operate that way. Thus, I have structured the RST column so
that the $31.50 tax is included in the $105 price paid to the florist. This allows me to
simplify the example by using the same 30% rate for both the income tax and the RST,
accord, President's Advisory Panel on Fed. Tax Reform, supra note 3, at 255, and it means
that when Cole paid $105 to the florist, he got $73.50 of flowers and $31.50 went to the
government. Of course, the RST would have a narrower base than the income tax.
Accordingly, revenue neutrality would probably require that the RST's tax inclusive rate
be higher than the income tax's 30% tax inclusive rate. See DODGE, FLEMING AND GEIER,
supra note 6, at 140-41. For the purpose of simplification, I have ignored that point
throughout this article.
Superficially, Cole's RST payment suggests that the government collects more revenue
in the RST scenario ($31.50) than in the income tax scenario ($30 + $1.05 = $31.05). But
the $30 1/1/1 income tax is not comparable to either of the 1/1/2 taxes because the
government has the use of the 1/1/1 tax throughout Year 1, but cannot use the 1/1/2 taxes
until Year 2. To make all the taxes comparable, either both of the 1/1/2 taxes must be
discounted back to 1/1/1 using a 5% discount rate or the $30 of 1/1/1 income tax must be
brought forward to 1/1/2 using a 5% interest rate. When the latter is done, the total
income tax yield is $31.50 + $1.05 = $32.55 which is $1.05 greater than the RST yield. The
$1.05 excess, of course, reflects the 1/1/2 income tax that was collected on the $3.50 of
interest in the income tax column.
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firms this point.13 Others would contend that because the Year 1 income
tax on Cole's $100 of wages was a levy on the present value of all future
returns from investing those wages, the January 1, Year 2 income tax on
his interest was actually a second levy on capital income. By comparison,
so this argument goes, the RST reached the interest only once, when it
was consumed, and this illustrates that an income tax double burdens
capital income while a postpaid consumption tax burdens it only once.14
This is an interesting controversy to which I will return near the end of
this article. Table 1, however, raises other important questions regarding
the comparative Year 2 effects of the income tax and the RST that have
been little explored. To be specific, by what means did the RST achieve a
bottom-line result in Table 1 that was $1.05 "better" for Cole than the
income tax result, and does the answer have significant implications? Let
us now turn to those questions.
IV. A FIRST STEP TOWARD ANSWERS
To begin a search for answers, recall that if Cole had spent $100 for
flowers on January 1, Year 1 in the RST scenario of Example 1, Table 1
shows that he would have gotten only $70 of flowers-the remaining $30
of his $100 payment to the florist would have effectively gone to finance
the government. Thus, when Cole received $100 of wages on January 1,
Year 1 in an RST world, those wages represented $70 available for his
personal use and $30 of federal government RST revenue. Indeed, if the
debenture debtor had immediately become bankrupt and the debenture
worthless, Cole's only real loss would have been the $70 of consumption
that he could have enjoyed but for the debenture purchase. The remain-
ing $30 of the loss would have been borne by the Treasury.
This is a necessary implication of the "Power to lay and collect Taxes"
granted to Congress by the United States Constitution. 15 When a Con-
gress, elected by "we the people," lawfully exercises its constitutionally
delegated taxing power, the legitimate allocation of the tax base between
federal uses and other uses is then defined until Congress takes further
action. 16 Thus, it is reasonable to say that the federal government has a
claim on each taxpayer's tax base equal to the portion that must be
turned over to the federal government under existing constitutionally
compliant revenue laws. 17 This means that in our Example 1 RST hypo-
thetical, the federal claim is $30 of Cole's $100 of wages.
13. See generally, e.g., DODGE, FLEMING & GEIER, supra note 6, at 75; MURPHY &
NAGEL, supra note 6, at 101; Avi-Yonah, supra note 4, at 1658; Goldberg, supra note 4, at
23; McCaffery, supra note 3, at 809-11; David A. Weisbach, The (Non) Taxation of Risk, 58
TAX L. REV. 1-2 (2004).
14. See, e.g., DODGE, FLEMING & GEIER, supra note 6, at 73-74; RICHARD A. Mus-
GRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 161-62 (1959); McCaffery, supra note 3, at 812-
13; Shaviro, supra note 10, at 104-05.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
16. See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 6, at 190.
17. See infra parts VI-VIII.
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V. AN OLD CANARD: THE GOVERNMENT OWNS ALL
YOUR INCOME
An RST proponent might respond that the preceding analysis assumes
government ownership of all income generated within the United States
(and abroad by U.S. citizens and residents) and, therefore, that it implic-
itly argues for a government claim to 100% of Cole's wages, not just 30%.
But this is merely a version of the red herring that has been used for years
to support illegitimate criticism of tax expenditure analysis.18 Not only is
it baseless in the tax expenditure setting, but it also lacks validity with
regard to the analysis of Cole's situation.
The Example 1 RST hypothetical actually argues that the federal claim
to Cole's wages is a percentage that is defined and limited by a legitimate
process. Specifically, if a Congress elected by the American voters exer-
cised its constitutionally-delegated power to impose a federal RST with a
30% rate, the federal government has a 30% claim with respect to Cole's
wages. The 30% benchmark is wholly dependent on the fact that it was
chosen through a legitimate law-making process. Stated differently, law-
ful congressional action has set the federal claim at 30% until a future
Congress adopts a change. Because 30% was as far as Congress went in
the Example 1 RST scenario, there is no implication that the federal
claim is 100% or any other amount greater than 30%.
Of course, a future Congress could, in theory, enact an RST with a rate
approaching 100%.19 If it did so (clearly an implausible event in a world
where the top VAT rate for Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development ("OECD") countries is 25%20 and where the U.S. tax bur-
den has been remarkably stable over time and actually trending down-
ward since 200021), its action would raise the federal claim from 30% to
the new percentage because the new percentage would be the product of
a legitimate democratic process. But until Congress takes such action in
the Example 1 RST scenario, the federal claim is 30%, not 100%, and any
contrary assertion is a misrepresentation.
18. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXA-
TION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 55-56 (5th ed. 2005) (quoting The $91 Billion Loophole,
WALL ST. J., March 20, 1975, at 22); Bruce Bartlett, The End of Tax Expenditures as We
Know Them?, 92 TAX NOTES 413, 419 (2001).
19. Presumably, an RST with a 100% rate (calculated as in Table 1) would be an im-
possibility because it would divert all sales revenue to the Government and leave nothing
for sellers.
20. See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, supra note 3, at 253-54;
Jeffrey Owens, Fundamental Tax Reform: The Experience of OECD Countries, TAX
FOUND. 9-10 (Background Paper No. 47, Feb. 2005). See also Adam Carasso and C. Eu-
gene Steuerle, Changes in Total Government Tax Receipts Since 1929, 100 TAX NOTES 953,
953 (2003); Leonard E. Burman & Elaine M. Maag, Income Tax Burden Peaked in 1980s,
97 TAx NOTES 1613 (2002).
21. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HISTORICAL EFFECTIVE FEDERAL TAX RATES: 1979
TO 2002, tbl. 1A (2005); Owens, supra note 20, at 2.
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VI. THE ALLEGATION OF INDETERMINATENESS
An RST proponent might respond that the preceding argument is in-
correct because it admits that through congressional modification of the
RST rate, the federal share of Cole's wages can change before Cole con-
sumes the debenture investment. Therefore, so this response goes, it is
meaningless to regard the government as having a share of Cole's wages
because the federal share is fatally indeterminate. Let us consider that
point. What if the law does change after Cole buys the debenture? What
if the RST rate is cut to 20%, or raised to 40% halfway through the year
in Example 1? This merely means that the government elected to surren-
der ten percentage points of its claim to Cole's saved wages in the first
case and to expand its 30% share by ten percentage points in the second
case. Neither conclusion undermines the fact that the federal share was
30% when Cole received the wages. Moreover, VAT rates in OECD
countries have hardly changed in the last fifteen years.2 2 This suggests
that a U.S. RST would likely have stable rates and that speculative, im-
probable changes should not be allowed to trump the conclusion that
Cole purchased the debenture with wages that included a 30% federal
share.
Moreover, to argue that the government does not have a 30% claim on
Cole's wages when they are earned because the RST rate might change
before consumption occurs effectively amounts to asserting that the fed-
eral claim on Cole's unconsumed wages is zero. But we live in a time
when a U.S. president who regularly proposes budgets that exceed $2
trillion is generally regarded as a fiscal conservative. 23 The present and
future of the United States is one in which trillions of dollars of federal
taxes must be raised each year 24 to pay for at least a major portion of the
spending programs of either the right or the left, and there is no plausible
scenario that would suggest change. 25 Indeed, for all except low income
Americans, the decision to continue living in the United States in the face
of these facts, instead of emigrating to the Cayman Islands or some other
tax haven, amounts to acquiescing in a substantial present federal tax
claim over one's present and future income. 26 Therefore, in the context
22. See Owens, supra note 20, at 9.
23. President Bush's fiscal 2006 budget proposes outlays of $2.568 trillion for fiscal
year 2006, $2.656 trillion for fiscal year 2007, and $2.758 trillion for fiscal year 2008. See
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOV'T, FISCAL YEAR 2006, tbl. S-1.
24. For fiscal year 2005, total federal receipts were $2.154 trillion. See John W. Snow,
Sec'y of the Treas., and Joshua B. Bolten, Dir. of the Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Joint
Statement on Budget Results for Fiscal Year 2005, reprinted in TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct.
17, 2005, LEXIS, 2005 TNT 199-17.
25. See A NEW TAX FRAMEWORK, supra note 4; David Wessell, Politicians Must De-
cide How to Raise Taxes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2005, at A2.
26. In this vein, Bruce Bartlett, a well-known conservative public finance economist
who has been prominently identified with efforts to reduce taxes, federal expenditures and
the size of the federal government recently said:
[T]here is really no hope of significantly cutting entitlement spending. Re-
publican support for the Medicare drug benefit convinced me that spending
in the U.S. is eventually going to rise to European levels and not much of
[Vol. 59
Postpaid Consumption Tax
of Example 1, it is fatuous to believe that with complete RST replace-
ment of the income tax, Cole can consume the $100 invested in the de-
benture without paying any RST. From the moment he earns his wages
he is under a "tax cloud." Accordingly, when the choice between defin-
ing the federal tax claim as of the time Cole earns his wages is either zero
or the then applicable 30% RST rate, viewing the federal tax claim as
30% instead of zero is the better choice.
VII. EFFECT OF PERMANENTLY FORGONE CONSUMPTION
An RST proponent might respond that the preceding arguments as-
sume that all of Cole's savings are ultimately consumed (thereby trigger-
ing the RST) when the fact is that some amounts are invested in
perpetuity and passed from generation to generation without ever being
consumed. 27 Because these perpetually invested sums would never be
subjected to an RST, the RST advocate might assert that it is fallacious to
regard the government as having any share in the $100 of wages that Cole
used in the Example 1 RST scenario to purchase the debenture. But this
response works only with respect to permanently saved amounts. Cole
ultimately consumed the debenture investment and can not rely on the
perpetual savings argument. When he liquidated the debenture and
spent the proceeds on flowers for Louise, he revealed that the govern-
ment had a 30% share of the wages embedded in his investment
VIII. EFFECT OF DEFERRED CONSUMPTION
The RST proponent might next respond that the government's share of
Cole's wages did not arise in the Example 1 RST scenario until, and to
the extent that, Cole consumed his debenture investment. Therefore, so
the argument goes, the government had no share of Cole's wages at the
time he purchased the debenture because 100% of the money invested in
the debenture was Cole's until he chose to consume it. Thus, there was
no joint investment with government money. This is more powerful than
the preceding argument about permanently saved amounts, and it invites
a consideration of the fact that there is a spectrum of possible points at
which the government's 30% claim could be said to attach to Cole's $100
of wages. That spectrum is illustrated by the time line in Table 2.
The preceding analysis has argued that the proper point on this time
line at which to view the government as having a definite interest in
Cole's $100 of wages in the Example 1 RST scenario is the first point-
when the wages are earned-and not the third point when Cole buys the
flowers. This is because without a change in the law, it is certain that
whenever Cole converts either the wages or the debenture principal and
anything can be done about it because it is being driven by programs with
broad political support and a rapidly aging society.
Joseph J. Thorndike, Tax Analysts Exclusive: Conversations: Bruce Bartlett, 109 TAX
NoTEs, 880, 881 (2005).
27. See KEVIN PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY 117-19 (2002).
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TABLE 2
Points in Time at which the Government's
30% RST Claim Might Be Said to Attach to Cole's Wages
When Wages When Cole When Cole
Are Earned Buys Debenture Buys Flowers
interest to consumption, 30% will go to the government; the government
is always lurking in the shadows to claim its constitutionally legitimate2 8
share, as defined by congressional legislation then in effect. Moreover, if
Cole thinks carefully about the issue, he will know that whenever he con-
verts the wages or the debenture investment to consumption, the best
prediction is that only 70% of the proceeds can be enjoyed as consump-
tion benefits.
IX. JOINT INVESTOR ANALYSIS
On balance, regarding the government as having not less than a 30%
RST share of Cole's wages when they are earned, so that Cole and the
government are joint investors (with the government exposed to a $30
loss if the debenture becomes worthless), seems a better interpretation
than regarding Cole as the sole owner of the debenture. 29
Viewed in this light, Cole's January 1, Year 1 purchase of the $100 de-
benture in the Example 1 RST scenario was actually a joint investment of
$70 of his own money and $30 of the government's money.30 The follow-
ing table shows the results of this conclusion:
28. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
29. See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 6, at 175 ("Property rights are the rights people
have in the resources they are entitled to control after taxes, not before.").
30. Some authorities have implicitly reached a similar conclusion with respect to the
cash flow consumption tax, a tax which, when it employs a single rate, is generally
equivalent to a single-rate RST. See 1 U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, TAX REFORM FOR FAIR-
NESS, SIMPLICrrY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 208 (1984) ("The deduction [in a cash flow
consumption tax] for saving and investment has the effect of making the government a
,silent partner' in the investment."); Graetz, supra note 6, at 1603 (stating that under a cash
flow consumption tax, "the government can be regarded as automatically becoming a joint
venturer in taxpayers' investments"); Weisbach, supra note 13, at 23. ("The cash flow tax
means that the government effectively has purchased t units of the asset where t is the tax
rate."). See also Comm. on Simplification, Section of Tax'n, AM. BAR Ass'N, Complexity
and the Personal Consumption Tax, 35 TAX LAW. 415, 438 (1982) (characterizing a cash
flow corporation tax as "equivalent to a government matching program"). See also E. Cary
Brown, Business Income Taxation and Investment Incentives, in INCOME EMPLOYMENT
AND PUBLIC POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ALVIN H. HANSEN 300, 309-10 (1948) (arguing
that if an income tax allowed the cost of long-lived business assets to be deducted entirely
in the year of purchase, "the government would literally be a partner in the firm. It would
make a capital contribution on new investment at the same rate at which it shared in the
future net receipts of the enterprise.").
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TABLE 3 (REFORMULATION OF TABLE 1 RST SCENARIO)
Cole Government Totals
1/1/1 Debenture Investment $70 $3031 $100
5% Interest for One Year $ 3.50 $ 1.5032 $ 5
Total Return on 1/1/2 $73.50 $31.50 $105
From this perspective, the $5 of interest that Cole received on January
1, Year 2 in the Example 1 RST scenario, illustrated by Table 1, was actu-
ally composed of $3.50 of untaxed interest on his $70 investment in the
debenture and $1.50 of interest on the government's $30 share of the de-
benture principal. Accordingly, Table 3 shows that Cole's total return on
January 1, year 2 in the Example 1 RST scenario was not the $105 shown
in Table 1. It was only $73.50 (tax-free recovery of his $70 investment
plus $3.50 of tax-free interest thereon). Consistent with this analysis,
Cole's $31.50 RST payment on January 1, Year 2 was actually nothing
more than a delivery to the government of its $30 share of the $100 of
debenture principal plus its $1.50 share of the $5 of January 1, Year 2
interest.33 Stated differently, the RST merely allowed the government to
collect its $30 investment in the debenture plus $1.50 interest thereon, but
no tax was levied on Cole's $3.50 share of the $5 of interest. Thus, the
$1.05 tax imposed on Cole's $3.50 of interest in the Example 1 income tax
scenario disappeared in the RST scenario because the joint investor anal-
ysis shows that the RST, in contrast to an income tax, did not reach Cole's
31. This $30 is the government's investment in the form of deferred tax that Cole uses
along with $70 of his own money to purchase a $100 debenture instead of a $70 debenture.
32. This $1.50 is effectively the government's share of the $5 of gross interest rather
than a tax collected from Cole.
33. Other commentators have suggested this conclusion with respect to a postpaid
consumption tax, albeit indirectly. See Anne L. Alstott, The Uneasy Liberal Case Against
Income and Wealth Transfer Taxation: A Response to Professor McCaffery, 51 TAX L. REV.
363, 365 n.11 (1996) ("Although amounts withdrawn from savings are nominally taxed
when consumed, the apparent tax on investment income is actually offset by the earlier
exclusion accorded to savings."); Joseph Bankman & Barbara H. Fried, Winners and
Losers in the Shift to a Consumption Tax, 86 GEO. L.J. 539, 540 (1998) ("The conventional
explanation . . . is a taxpayer's ability ... to use the tax savings from writing off her initial
investments in year one to increase the level of her initial investment. This grossed-up
investment generates a return that is greater... by the amount of tax eventually owed on
the aggregate return when dissaved."); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., How Much Capital Income
Taxed Under an Income Tax is Exempt Under a Cash Flow Tax?, 52 TAX L. REV. 1, 3
(1996) ("As long as investment of the tax savings from expensing produces the same rate
of return as the taxpayer's original investment, the proceeds from investment of the tax
savings will fully fund future taxes on the total amount invested."). Christopher H. Hanna,
The Virtual Reality of Eliminating Tax Deferral, 12 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 449, 456-57 (1995)
reaches this conclusion regarding the expensing of investment assets under an income tax
regime.
Stephen Land has advocated treating the government as a joint investor as a means to
eliminate the deferral benefit that results under the income tax from the realization re-
quirement. He does not, however, suggest that the joint investor analysis should be used to
deconstruct a consumption tax regime. See Stephen B. Land, Defeating Deferral: A Propo-
sal for Retrospective Taxation, 52 TAX L. REv. 45, 73, 84 (1996). See also Deborah H.
Schenk, An Efficiency Approach to Reforming a Realization-Based Tax, 57 TAX L. REV.
503, 544-47 (2004).
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$3.50 share of the debenture interest.34
X. A GOVERNMENT SCHEME FOR "MATCHING"
PRIVATE INVESTMENT
The foregoing joint investor analysis indicates that if the federal in-
come tax were replaced with the RST illustrated in Table 1 and decon-
structed in Table 3, the result would be to create a taxing regime in which
Cole's decision to save would force the government to become a 30%
joint participant in all of Cole's investments. 35 Stated more broadly, an
RST or other form of postpaid consumption tax necessarily amounts to a
scheme for providing government assistance to all private investors just
as the government "matched" Cole's $70 investment in the debenture
with its own $30 participation.
XI. DISTINGUISHING THE INCOME TAX
How is the income tax different in this respect? Let us investigate that
question by rearranging the results of the income tax column of Table 1
into a format similar to Table 3. Table 4 shows the results.
TABLE 4 (REFORMULATION OF TABLE 1 INCOME
TAX SCENARIO)
Cole Government Totals
1/1/1 $100 of wages $70.00 $30.00 (1/1/1 tax) $100.00
1/1/1 Debenture Investment $70.00 -0- $ 70.00
5% Interest for One Year $ 2.45 $ 1.05 (1/1/2 tax) $ 3.50
(after-tax)
Table 4 characterizes the government as having no part of the deben-
ture investment because the $30 of tax collected from Cole's $100 of
wages on January 1, Year 1 was held by the government free and clear for
immediate public use instead of being embedded in an investment chosen
by Cole. And from Cole's standpoint, his January 1, Year 1 $30 income
tax payment with respect to his wages took care of the government so
that Cole's $70 January 1, Year 1 debenture purchase was an investment
play made entirely with his money. This conclusion is reinforced by the
fact that on January 1, Year 2, the debenture produced total interest of
only $3.50 in the Example 1 income tax scenario, not $5 as in the RST
scenario, and the government imposed a $1.05 income tax on the $3.50 of
Year 2 interest, instead of collecting a $1.50 share of $5 of Year 2 interest
as in the Example 1 RST scenario.
Nevertheless, the government does have a financial interest of sorts in
the Example 1 income tax scenario, as deconstructed in Table 4. To be
34. As indicated in supra note 10, Cole's interest is assumed to equal the riskless rate
of return.
35. See generally authorities cited in supra note 33.
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specific, the government will collect (1) $1.05 of income tax on January 1,
Year 2 in this income tax hypothetical if the $70 debenture yields the full
$3.50 of contract interest, (2) zero tax if none of the interest is paid, or (3)
a tax somewhere between zero and $1.05 if the interest is only partially
paid. On the downside, if the debenture principal is not fully collected, 36
Cole's loss deduction will cost the government revenue-$21 of revenue
($70 x .30) where the debenture becomes completely worthless. 37 Be-
cause of these upside and downside possibilities, the government is not
indifferent to Cole's investment results in Example l's income tax
scenario. 38
There are, however, important differences between the Example 1 in-
come tax and RST settings. First, in the income tax scenario decon-
structed in Table 4, the government can never get its hands on any
portion of the $70 debenture principal. When the debenture matures,
Cole will have the entire $70 of principal available for consumption.39 In
contrast, the RST scenario deconstructed in Table 3 gives the government
a 30% interest in the $100 of debenture principal. When the debenture
matures and Cole consumes, the government will get 30% of the $100
principal as part of its tax take. Second, on the downside, the govern-
ment's loss exposure from worthlessness of the debenture is $30 in the
Example 1 RST scenario, but the government's loss will provide Cole
with no protection against loss of his $70 if the debenture implodes. In
comparison, the government's maximum loss exposure from worthless-
ness of the debenture is only $21 in the Example 1 income tax setting, but
if it were to occur, it would effectively reduce Cole's loss from $70 to $49.
Thus, on the downside, the government is a full joint investor in the Ex-
ample 1 RST scenario but only a limited insurer in the Example 1 income
tax setting.40 Third, the government's $30 joint investment in the RST
scenario allows Cole to scale the debenture investment up from $70 to
$100. In contrast, the government's financial interest in the Example 1
income tax scenario does not involve a matching financial contribution
36. Granted, Cole's investment was assumed to be riskless. See text supra note 10.
However, even "riskless" plays have a small chance of going bad.
37. In Schanz-Haig-Simons terms, complete worthlessness would cause Cole's wealth
to decrease by $70 without any consumption benefit. Therefore, a $70 deduction is appro-
priate. See DODGE, FLEMING & GEIER, supra note 6, at 37-39, 57-60. This would probably
be a capital loss deduction under I.R.C. § 165(g). This simplified hypothetical, however,
assumes that Cole's deduction would be taken against ordinary income that is taxable at
30%.
38. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, The Entrepreneurship Effect: An Accidental External-
ity in the Federal Income Tax, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1401, 1435-37 (2004).
39. See I.R.C. § 1012 (2003).
40. Professor Lederman has said that the loss sharing imposed on the government by
loss deductions in an income tax regime means that "the government has become a partner
in the investor's wager." See Lederman, supra note 38, at 1439. As indicated by Cole's
hypothetical, however, the government's partnership role in an income tax scenario is con-
siderably more limited than in a postpaid consumption tax setting, and the differences
justify treating the two cases as distinct. See also Joseph M. Dodge, Theories of Tax Justice:
Ruminations on the Benefit, Partnership, and Ability-to-Pay Principles, 58 TAx L. REV. 399,
444-48 (2005).
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that permits Cole to scale up-the debenture investment is limited to
Cole's $70. (The full consequences of this latter point will be explored in
the next section.) For these reasons, it makes sense to view the govern-
ment as a joint debenture investor in the Example 1 RST scenario, but
not in the income tax setting, even though the preceding explanation
shows that the government does have a contingent financial stake in
Cole's affairs under an income tax regime.
XII. DISQUIETING CONSEQUENCES
So the RST and other postpaid consumption taxes can be analyzed in
terms of a joint investor construct. So what? Is the joint investor ap-
proach just a clever trick or does it have practical consequences? Indeed,
there are practical consequences.
At the outset, this "joint investor" or "government matching" interpre-
tation of the RST as a replacement for the income tax raises two process
issues. First, Cole decides how the government's 30% will be invested. 41
In our example, he put the money into a safe, innocuous investment-a
bluechip corporate debenture. But it could have been a high-risk crap-
shoot (say a purchase of a racehorse) with government funds presently
needed for education, homeland security, etc. Or it could have been a
socially problematic investment (a cigarette factory, a factory turning out
cheap handguns, a legal Nevada brothel, etc.). Stated differently, Cole's
decision about how to invest the government's money may differ radically
from the way most Americans would prefer to see public funds handled
and, therefore, may result in public funds being allocated in ways that
would never occur through the congressional appropriations process. 42
41. See also Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditure Analysis and Constitutional Decisions, 50
HASTINGS L.J. 407, 435 n.126 (1999). Of course, the I.R.C. § 170 charitable contribution
deduction is often analyzed as a program of government matching grants to donees se-
lected by contributing taxpayers. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L.
REV. 387, 404-13 (1998). But the amount of the "match" is constrained by the §§ 170(b),
(e) limitations on the deduction, and the purposes for which the government will make its
"grants" are restricted by the limited range of donees listed in § 170(c). There are no such
constraints on the government "match" in a postpaid consumption tax regime. Moreover,
§ 170 donees often do things that the government would otherwise have to pay for with
appropriations funded by taxing the public. This is unlikely to be true of the beneficiaries
of the government "match" in an RST regime. For these reasons, the objections raised by
joint investor analysis to proposals for replacing the income tax with a postpaid consump-
tion tax do not apply directly to §170. However, the distributional problem that results
from the fact that §170 deductions provide greater benefits to high-bracket taxpayers than
to low-bracket taxpayers is related to the distributional problem described hereinafter re-
garding the joint investor effect of a postpaid consumption tax.
42. Of course, the present income tax would give the U.S. Treasury a portion of Cole's
profits from these problematic businesses, (see I.R.C. § 61(a) (West 2006)), and, through
the §165 loss deduction, would cause the Treasury to bear a portion of any losses suffered
by Cole. This is entirely appropriate with respect to the profits because they represent
previously untaxed accessions to wealth. It is also appropriate with respect to the losses
because they are wealth diminutions that cannot be classified as consumption. More im-
portantly, for reasons explained in section XI supra, these incidents of the present income
tax give the government a mere contingent interest in Cole's socially problematic invest-
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The second process problem is that Cole, not our elected representa-
tives, determines the amount of the government's investment by his own
choice of how much to invest. In this example, every $0.70 that Cole
invests compels a $0.30 matching investment by the government, and
every $1 that he invests mandates a $0.43 government match. Moreover,
there is no limit, other than low income, to the number of taxpayers who
can, like Cole, force the government to match their investments. Stated
differently, an RST that replaced the income tax would allow private sav-
ers to achieve unlimited preemption of the congressional appropriations
process .43
These points about process lead to a distributional concern arising from
the fact that the same investments are not open to all savers. Instead, the
types of investments that are available depend on the amount of capital
that the investor has at her disposal. Small savers are limited to mutual
funds, passbook savings accounts, and other modest-return savings vehi-
cles. Only big savers have the kind of investment scale that allows them
to get into, or expand participation in, the high return investments-
IPOs, 44 hedge funds,45 private equity funds,46 real estate syndications,
foreign direct investments, etc. Moreover, big savers get various kinds of
advantageous treatment that are not available to small savers.47 But the
government "match" in an RST regime is large for the big saver and as-
sists her in scaling up her investments while the government "match" for
small savers is small and leaves them unable to participate in the most
lucrative investment media or receive the best treatment. Big savers are
disproportionately high income individuals. 48 Thus, an RST is a govern-
ments that is materially less significant than the joint investor position that the government
would assume under a postpaid consumption tax.
43. If, as suggested in the text supra note 4, a postpaid consumption tax were adopted
as a supplement to the income tax, this process issue would still be present, but savers
would be forced to pay for the government match with income tax payments.
44. See, e.g., RICHARD W. JENNINGS, HAROLD MARSH, JR., JorrN C. COFFEE, JR. &
JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 298-300 (8th ed. 1998); Kevin J. Delaney,
Google IPO Revisited: Insiders Got Choice Other Sellers Didn't, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16,
2005, at Al.
45. See, e.g., Henny Sender, Hedge Funds Nip at Wall Street, WALL ST. J., May 26,
2005, at C1.
46. See Randall Smith, How Merrill CEO Warms to Risk, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2005, at
Cl.
47. See e.g., Susanne Craig, NASD Probes Merrill Lynch "Call Centers," WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 18, 2005, at Cl; Jane J. Kim, Brokerages Cut Yields for Small Investors, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 26, 2005, at Dl; Tom Lauricella, Fidelity Cuts Fees for Big Investors, WALL ST. J., Oct.
18, 2005, at C15.
48. See, e.g., ISAAC SHAPIRO & JOEL FRIEDMAN, CENTER FOR BUDGET AND POLICY
STUDIES, NEW UNNOTICED CBO DATA SHOW CAPITAL INCOME HAS BECOME MUCH
MORE CONCENTRATED AT THE Top (2006), available at http://www.cbpp.org/1-29-
06tax2.pdf; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, UTILIZATION OF TAX INCENTIVES FOR RETIREMENT
SAVING: AN UPDATE 2 (2006); David Wessell, Rich Get Richer, but Not as Fast as You
Think, WALL ST. J. Mar. 2, 2006, at A2; David Joulfaian & David Richardson, Who Takes
Advantage of Tax-Deferred Savings Programs? Evidence from Federal Income Tax Data,
54 NAT'L TAX J. 669 (2001); Gary Koening & Robert Harvey, Utilization of the Saver's
Credit: An Analysis of the First Year, 58 NAT'L TAX. J. 787, 792-93 (2005); Martin J. McMa-
hon, Jr., The Matthew Effect and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. REV. 993, 1017-21 (2004);
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ment investment assistance scheme that is tilted toward the wealthy. 49
One way to evaluate this outcome is to ask if Congress were to con-
sider a scheme of encouraging private investments by having the Treasury
make direct matching investments with Treasury cash, would Congress
shape the scheme so that there was no limit on the government's obliga-
tion to match and so that high income taxpayers got a much larger match
that assisted them in exploiting investment media from which lower in-
come taxpayers were foreclosed? Not likely. Thus, it seems problematic
to accomplish the same result indirectly by replacing the federal income
tax with an RST.
XIII. AN INCOME TAX BIAS?
Is the joint investor analysis based on an assumption that the income
tax is normatively superior to an RST? Stated differently, is the joint
investor analysis the product of a pro-income-tax bias? The answers
would seem to be "no" because the joint investor analysis is actually em-
bedded in consumption tax orthodoxy. The standard explanation of post-
paid consumption taxes points out that, as shown in the RST column of
Table 1, the government loses none of the deferred consumption tax5° by
postponing collection until the taxpayer consumes. 51 According to the
standard explanation, there is no loss to the fisc because the tax base
grows through investment returns during the deferral period so that when
consumption finally occurs, the tax base is greater by the amount of the
investment return. Thus, the government collects a larger tax that fully
compensates it for the delay.52 But this amounts to arguing that the gov-
ernment is a joint investor with the taxpayer during the time that consum-
able funds are diverted into an investment. In other words, the joint
investor analysis is an essential part of the orthodox explication of post-
paid consumption taxes and does not depend on income tax norms for its
validity.53
Christopher Conkey, Typical U.S. Family's Net Worth Edged Up Only 1.5% in '01-'04,
WALL Sr. J., Feb. 24, 2006, at A-4; see also Robert Guy Matthews, Recovery Bypasses
Many Americans, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 2005, at A2.
49. If, as suggested in the text supra note 4, a postpaid consumption tax were adopted
as a supplement to the income tax, high income savers could be forced to pay for the tilt
through the income tax.
50. Of course, the government does lose the income tax in Table 1 on the investment
return.
51. This assumes that tax rates and interest rates remain constant during the deferral
period.
52. See, e.g., U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 123 (1977)
[hereinafter Blueprints]; Andrews, supra note 11, at 1150; McCaffery, supra note 3, at 823-
25; Shaviro, supra note 10, at 104-05.
53. See McCaffery, supra note 3, at 932 ("a postpaid consumption tax importantly re-
defines property rights: it changes what it means for wealth to be one's own. Society has a
stake in the private savings accounts, and is justified in regulating them, just as it does now
with IRAs and pension plans.").
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XIV. SO WHAT'S NEW? AREN'T WE ALREADY THERE?
It has been long noted that the present income tax has many consump-
tion tax features. For example, if in the income tax column of Table 1
Cole had used his $100 of wages to make a deductible contribution to an
IRA, then he would have had a $100 after-tax investment and $5 of Janu-
ary 1, Year 2 interest, just as in the RST column.54 Other prominent con-
sumption tax elements within the federal income tax are the non-taxation
of unrealized gains,55 the substantial non-taxation of realized gains from
selling owner-occupied homes, 56 the exemption for interest on state and
local government obligations, 57 and various forms of tax-preferred retire-
ment plans in addition to the IRA.5 8 The point is sometimes made that
these features have substantially converted the federal income tax into a
consumption tax regime and that formally replacing the federal income
tax with an explicit consumption tax system would not be a significant
change. 59
It should be noted, however, that these consumption tax features re-
present either practical concessions to administrative difficulties (non-
taxation of unrealized gains) or decisions to effectuate discrete federal
policies through the tax expenditure process-that is, (1) encouragement
of private home ownership through substantial non-taxation of gains
from selling owner-occupied homes, plus the mortgage interest deduc-
tion, (2) federal aid to state and local governments in the form of the
I.R.C. § 103 exemption, and (3) encouragement of private retirement sav-
ings by means of various tax-preferred savings plans. Like most tax ex-
penditures, these consumption tax features are mostly overbroad,
inefficient, and incoherent. Nevertheless, they are intentionally targeted
to particular ends and have substantial built-in limits. In contrast, re-
placement of the federal income tax with a postpaid consumption tax re-
gime would effectively require the federal government to match any
private saving regardless of purpose or amount. This would take us sub-
stantially beyond where we are today.
XV. UNREALIZED GAINS: ACHILLES' HEEL REDUX
The realization requirement, which Professor Andrews has called the
Achilles' heel of the income tax,60 is indeed a serious structural flaw. This
is because it allows income tax on accrued but unrealized investment
54. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN AND BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
LAW 223-24, 229-31 (3d ed. 2000).
55. See generally I.R.C. § 1014 (West 2006); Cottage Says. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S.
554 (1991).
56. See I.R.C. § 121.
57. See id. § 103.
58. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 54, at 222-24.
59. See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 52, at 33-35; Goldberg, supra note 4, at 25; McCaffery,
supra note 3, at 933-34, 936-38.
60. See William D. Andrews, The Achilles' Heel of the Comprehensive Income Tax, in
NEW DIRECTIONS IN FEDERAL TAx POLICY FOR THE 1980s 278, 280 (Charles E. Walker &
Mark A. Bloomfield eds., 1983).
20061
SMU LAW REVIEW
yields (that is, appreciation in land and growth stocks) to be deferred
until the investments are disposed of in taxable transactions, 61 while the
yields from investments that generate realized gains (that is, dividend-
paying stocks and interest-paying bonds) bear a current tax.62 This differ-
ence powerfully distorts investor choices in favor of making unrealized
yield investments and in favor of continuing to hold such investments in-
stead of selling them and moving on when economically superior oppor-
tunities appear.63
There have been several thoughtful proposals to significantly limit the
realization requirement's distortions, but none have been adopted,64 and
it seems that for the time being, Henry Simons was correct in characteriz-
ing a broad realization requirement as a necessary feature of a practical
income tax.65 Accordingly, property appreciation gains are generally not
subject to U.S. federal income taxation until they are realized through a
transaction qualifying as a realization event,66 and even then taxation will
be deferred if the realization event is covered by any of several nonrecog-
nition provisions. 67 This seems similar to the non-taxation under a post-
paid consumption tax of investment earnings prior to their being spent on
consumption. In addition, neither the income tax nor a postpaid con-
sumption tax will ever be collected on unrealized property appreciation
to the extent that the appreciation is erased by value declines occurring
prior to realization or consumption. These facts invite a consideration of
whether there is any meaningful difference between the treatment of un-
realized property appreciation under an income tax versus its treatment
under a postpaid consumption tax. If not, then for a broad range of in-
vestments, the distributional consequences of a postpaid consumption tax
and an income tax are the same. There clearly is a significant difference,
however, as illustrated by Example 2.
Example 2. The facts are the same as in Example 1 except that on
January 1, Year 1, Cole purchases an investment that produces only
unrealized appreciation at 5% per year, and Cole does not sell the
investment and spend the proceeds on flowers for Louise until Janu-
ary 1, Year 3. Table 5 shows the results.
61. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1001.
62. See id. §§ 61(a)(4), (7).
63. See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 5, at 286; Deborah H. Schenk, A Positive
Account of the Realization Rule, 57 TAX L. REv. 355, 383-92 (2004).
64. See Schenk, supra note 33, at 520-47.
65. See SIMONS, supra note 11; see also Andrews, supra note 11; Ronald A. Pearlman,
A Tax Reform Caveat: In the Real World, There Is No Perfect Tax System, in TOWARD
FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 106, 108-09 (Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin A. Hassett eds.,
2005); Schenk, supra note 63, at 396.
66. See generally Cottage Savs. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554 (1991).
67. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 351, 1031 (West 2006).
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TABLE 5 (TABLE 1 WITH A THREE YEAR APPRECIATING
PROPERTY INVESTMENT)
Income Tax RST
1/1/1 Wages $100.00 $100.00
1/1/1 Tax @ 30% - 30.00 -0-
1/1/1 After-tax investment $ 70.00 $100.00
Appreciation during Year 1 @ 5% + 3.50 + 5.00
Year 2 investment $ 73.50 $105.00
Appreciation during Year 2 @ 5% + 3.68 + 5.25
1/1/3 income tax (.30 x [$3.50 + $3.68]) - 2.15 -0-
Gross 1/1/3 amount for consumption $ 75.03 $110.25
1/1/3 RST on flower purchase @ 30% -0- -33.0868
Net 1/1/3 consumption $ 75.03 $ 77.17
The next step is to bring the January 1, Year 1 income tax forward with
5% annual compound interest to January 1, Year 3, thereby making it
comparable to the two January 1, Year 3 taxes. This gives the $30 January
1, Year 1 income tax a January 1, Year 3 value of $33.08 (which equals the
January 1, Year 3 RST). Thus, the total income tax paid in Table 5, val-
ued as of January 1, Year 3, is $35.23 ($33.08 + $2.15), which is $2.15
greater than the January 1, Year 3 RST. In other words, the difference
between the income tax and RST scenarios in Table 5 is that the RST
allowed Cole to avoid the $2.15 income tax on his two-year investment
gain just as the RST allowed him to avoid the $1.05 income tax on his
investment gain in Table 1. Moreover, as was the case with Table 1, the
Table 5 RST scenario outcome is explained by the joint investor analyti-
cal approach under which Cole's January 1, Year 1 investment is regarded
as made with $30 of the government's money (30% RST rate x $100) and
$70 of his own money ($100 - $30 deferred RST). Table 6 illustrates this
point.
68. See supra note 12.
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TABLE 6 (REFORMULATION OF THE TABLE 5
RST SCENARIO)
Cole Government Totals
1/1/1 Debenture Investment $70.00 $30.0069 $100.00
Appreciation During Yr 1 @ 5% + 3.50 + 1.5070 + 5.00
1/1/2 Investment $73.50 $31.50 $105.00
Appreciation During Yr 2 @ 5% + 3.67 + 1.5871 + 5.25
Total Return on 1/1/3 $77.17 $33.08 $110.25
In other words, the $5.00 of asset appreciation that occurred in Table 5
during Year 1 was actually composed of $3.50 of untaxed appreciation on
Cole's $70 portion of the investment and $1.50 of appreciation on the
government's $30 portion. Likewise, the $5.25 of Year 2 asset apprecia-
tion was $3.67 of untaxed appreciation on Cole's share of the investment
plus $1.58 on the government's share. Thus, Table 6 shows that in the
RST scenario of Table 5, the $33.08 January 1, Year 3 RST merely al-
lowed the government to collect its $30 portion of Cole's investment, plus
$3.08 of the two years of asset appreciation on the government portion
($1.50 + $1.58),72 while Cole totally avoided tax on his portion of the
investment's two-year run-up in value. More broadly, Tables 5 and 6
show that in spite of the application of the income tax's realization re-
quirement in Example 2, the income tax and a postpaid consumption tax
produce significantly different results with respect to appreciating invest-
ments and that joint investor analysis explains the comparatively tax-
payer-friendly nature of the RST outcome.
But in the income tax scenario of Example 2, Cole bought the appreci-
ating investment with after-tax income. How significant is that fact? Let
us consider the result if, in Example 2, Cole purchased the investment
with pre-tax income. First, we must note that for our purposes, this is a
limited class of income. It excludes amounts that are the after-tax residue
of receipts taxed in prior years. For example, assume that Cole earned
$100 of wages in Year 1, paid $30 of income tax on those wages, and used
the remaining $70 to acquire an appreciating investment that grew to
$113 in Year 2. Further, assume that he then sold the investment, paid
30% income tax ($13) on his $43 gain, carried the remaining $100 ($70
basis + $30 after-tax gain) into Year 3, and used it to purchase an invest-
ment. Cole's Year 3 $100 purchase is simply an investment of his $70 of
after-tax Year 1 wages plus his $30 of after-tax Year 2 appreciation. The
69. This $30 is the government's investment in the form of deferred tax that Cole uses
along with $70 of his own money to purchase a $100 debenture instead of a $70 debenture.
70. This $1.50 is effectively the government's share of the $5 of Year 1 appreciation
rather than a tax collected from Cole.
71. This $1.58 is effectively the government's share of the $5.25 of Year 2 appreciation
rather than a tax collected from Cole.
72. Stated differently, because the government had a 30% share of the joint invest-
ment, the government had a 30% share of the $10.25 of investment appreciation that oc-
curred during Years 1 and 2 and that 30% appreciation share equals $3.08 ($10.25 x .30).
[Vol. 59
Postpaid Consumption Tax
fact that he paid tax on the $100 in Years 1 and 2 does not convert the
$100 into Year 3 pre-tax income.
Pre-tax income does literally include amounts that are rendered pre-tax
because they are deductible investments in tax-favored savings plans. As
explained previously, however, this class of income is rendered pre-tax by
congressional intervention for a narrow purpose and should be evaluated
by tax expenditure analysis rather than as part of an income tax/postpaid
consumption tax comparison. 73
Thus, for our purposes, pre-tax income is limited to such things as gifts
and bequests excluded from Cole's income by I.R.C. § 102(a), personal
injury recoveries excluded by I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), and asset appreciation
that has been excluded by the realization requirement and that Cole now
uses to purchase an investment in a transaction covered by a nonrecogni-
tion provision, such as I.R.C. § 351, § 721, or § 1031, so that the purchase
itself does not trigger taxation of the asset appreciation under the princi-
ple of United States v. Davis74 and International Freighting Corp. v.
Commissioner.75
With that background, let us assume that in Example 2, Cole purchased
the investment with $100 of cash that he had received as a § 102(a) ex-
cluded bequest. Table 7 shows the results.
TABLE 7 (TABLE 5 WITH THE INVESTMENT FUNDED BY
§102(a) EXCLUDED DOLLARS)
Income Tax RST
1/1/1 Bequest $100.00 $100.00
1/1/1 Tax @ 30% -0- -0-
1/1/1 Investment $100.00 $100.00
Appreciation during Year 1 @ 5% + 5.00 + 5.00
Year 2 investment $105.00 $105.00
Appreciation during Year 2 @ 5% + 5.25 + 5.25
1/1/3 Income tax (.30 x [$5.00 + $5.25]) - 3.08 -0-
Gross 1/1/3 amt for consumption $107.17 $110.25
1/1/3 RST on flower purchase @ 30% -0- - 33.08
Net 1/1/3 consumption $107.17 $ 77.17
In Table 7, unlike situations previously considered, the income tax
gives Cole a better result than the RST, $30 better in fact ($107.17 -
$77.17). The explanation, of course, is simple. Cole had $100 of invest-
ment basis in the income tax scenario, 76 but not in the RST scenario, and
the $30 superiority of the income tax result over the RST outcome is
73. See supra Part XIV.
74. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
75. 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943).
76. The income tax gave Cole a $100 basis in the excluded cash bequest, and in prop-
erty purchased with that cash, so that the effect of the § 102(a) exclusion would be pre-
served. In contrast, basis plays no role under an RST.
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nothing more than the $30 of tax that Cole saved in the income tax scena-
rio by recovering his $100 basis free of the 30% tax. Thus, Cole paid only
$3.08 of tax in the income tax scenario ($10.25 investment gain x .30) but
paid $33.08 in the RST scenario ($110.25 consumption x .30). Moreover,
the Table 6 joint investor analysis of the Example 2 RST scenario remains
fully applicable in Table 7. That is, the government was a 30% joint in-
vestor with Cole in the initial $100 investment that Cole made with the
gift proceeds, and the government's $33.08 Year 3 RST collection is the
sum of 30% of the initial investment plus 30% of the $10.25 of apprecia-
tion on that investment during Years 1 and 2.
Assume, however, that Cole had used a substantial amount of unreal-
ized appreciation to make the investment in Table 7. Let us say he trans-
ferred $50 basis property worth $100 in a § 351 tax-deferred exchange for
corporate stock and the other facts involved in Table 7 are unchanged.
Table 8 shows the results.
TABLE 8 (TABLE 5 WITH THE INVESTMENT HALF-FUNDED
WITH UNREALIZED APPRECIATION)
Income Tax RST
1/1/1 Investment $100.00 $100.00
Appreciation during Year 1 @ 5% + 5.00 + 5.00
Year 2 investment $105.00 $105.00
Appreciation during Year 2 @ 5% + 5.25 + 5.25
1/1/3 Income Tax (.30 x [$50 + $10.25]) 77  - 18.08 -0-
Gross 1/1/3 amount for consumption $ 92.17 $110.25
1/1/3 RST on flower purchase @ 30% -0- - 33.08
Net 1/1/3 consumption $ 92.17 $ 77.17
In Table 8, the income tax continues to give Cole a better result than
the RST, but the Table 7 gap has narrowed by half (from $30 to $15)
because the amount of Cole's recoverable income tax basis was reduced
by half (from $100 to $50). Indeed, if Cole had been in the rare situation
of making his § 351 exchange with equipment that had been depreciated
to a zero income tax basis but that was nevertheless worth $100, then he
would not have had any income tax basis to recover, and there would
have been no income tax saving therefrom. His income tax and RST re-
sults would, therefore, have been identical in Table 8.
To recapitulate, where Cole's investment was made with after-tax dol-
lars in which he had a full income tax basis (for example, dollars excluded
under § 102(a) or § 104(a)(2)), there was a difference between the in-
come tax and the RST scenarios, but unlike other situations we have con-
77. Section 358 gave Cole a $50 basis in the $100 worth of stock that he received in
exchange for property worth $100. Thus, when Cole sold the stock on January 1, Year 3, he
realized $50 of appreciation that was built into the stock when he acquired it plus the
$10.25 of additional appreciation that occurred during years 1 and 2.
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sidered, the income tax provided the taxpayer-friendly result. Thus, in
that discrete situation, replacement of the income tax with a postpaid
consumption tax would actually cause a tax increase for Cole and concern
for the fisc supports the replacement. But where Cole made his invest-
ment with unrealized appreciation and did so in a way that did not trigger
recognition of the appreciation, the difference in the income tax and RST
scenarios was dependent on the relative amounts of income tax basis and
unrealized appreciation inherent in the property transferred by Cole, and
where the income tax basis in the property was zero, there was no differ-
ence between the income tax and RST results. Thus, where taxpayers can
invest with pretax dollars, the fisc is either better off, or no worse off,
with a switch from an income tax to a postpaid consumption tax, and the
tax burden carried by upper income taxpayers who do the lion's share of
investing is either increased, or unchanged, by the switch.
As noted previously, however, these observations cover a rather nar-
row slice of the investing done in the United States and do not signifi-
cantly detract from the general thrust of my analysis. Moreover, the joint
investor analysis is fully applicable to the RST scenarios illustrated in Ta-
bles 7 and 8.
XVI. EXTENT OF THE EXEMPTION OF CAPITAL INCOME
UNDER A POSTPAID CONSUMPTION TAX
A significant body of commentary disaggregates returns to capital into
several components. A prominent example of this literature describes in-
vestment income as consisting of (1) riskless returns (compensation to
investors for merely waiting), (2) inflation premia, (3) returns to risk tak-
ers, and (4) supernormal returns.78 This literature then argues that
neither an income tax that is properly adjusted for inflation nor the vari-
ous approaches to postpaid consumption taxation reach inflation premia
and that if both forms of taxation are structured according to their re-
spective ideals, both reach supernormal returns but neither reaches re-
turns to risk taking. Thus, so the argument goes, there is no distinction
between an ideal income tax and an ideal postpaid consumption tax with
respect to items (2), (3), and (4), and the only difference is that an ideal
income tax reaches the riskless return to capital (item (1)), while an ideal
postpaid consumption tax does not.79 Because the riskless return to capi-
tal has been very low historically, this literature raises the possibility that
there is no meaningful difference between an ideal income tax and an
ideal postpaid consumption tax regarding the treatment of capital in-
78. See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 5, at 200-05; see also PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY
PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, supra note 3, at 153.
79. See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, supra note 3, at 153;
Shaviro, supra note 10, at 112; Weisbach, supra note 13, at 2; Joseph Bankman & David A.
Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax Over an Ideal Income Tax 6 (U.
Chi. Law Sch. John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 251, (2d ser.) 2005) available
at http://www.law.uchicago.edu[Lawecon/WkngPprs_251-300/251-daw-superiority.pdf.
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come.80 If this line of argument is correct, it may be a blow to those who
favor an income tax on the ground that its application to capital income,
which is concentrated in the hands of the wealthy, advances the concepts
of ability-to-pay and vertical equity.
There are, however, good reasons for rejecting this dismissal of the in-
come tax as an effective levy on capital income. First, if the risk-free rate
of return is towards the upper end of the range within which commenta-
tors have asserted that it falls, 81 it generates consumption tax exempt re-
turns that are too large to be dismissed as inconsequential. Second, the
contention that an income tax does not fall on returns to risk taking de-
pends on certain problematic assumptions,82 one of the most important of
which is that the income tax provides both an unrestricted deduction for
losses and unlimited refundabiltiy to the extent that the taxpayer lacks
insufficient income to fully absorb loss deductions. 83 But this article is
discussing postpaid consumption taxes as possible replacements for the
federal income tax as it is, not an ideal federal income tax. Unlimited
refundability of excess loss deductions is not part of the federal income
tax and is unlikely ever to be so. (In general, refundability presently ex-
ists only to the extent of refunds generated by the two-year carryback of
net operating losses allowed by § 172(b)(1)(A).). Moreover, the federal
income tax has important restrictions on the deductibility of losses, such
as the limitation on capital loss deductions, and that will always be the
case so long as there are tax-preferred forms of income. Thus, in the real
world, the federal income tax does apply to returns to risk taking in addi-
tion to the riskless rate of return, and substitution of a postpaid consump-
tion tax for the current federal income tax would exempt more capital
income than merely returns on riskless investments.
Finally, even if we were to grant the claim that postpaid consumption
taxes and the income tax are effectively indistinguishable with respect to
taxation of capital income, joint investor analysis shows that a postpaid
consumption tax nevertheless makes the government a joint participant
in all private investments.84 Moreover, the size of the riskless rate of re-
turn is irrelevant to this point because the extent of the government's
participation is defined by the consumption tax rate. Thus, even if the
riskless rate of return was zero or less, a 30% postpaid consumption tax
would make the government a 30% joint investor in all private invest-
ments, 85 and this fact presents the distributional and process issues dis-
cussed in part XII supra. An income tax does not have these effects.
80. See Weisbach, supra note 13, at 23-25.
81. See supra note 10.
82. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 4, at 1656-57; Lederman, supra note 38, at 1435-40.
83. See Weisbach, supra note 13, at 8-9; Lederman, supra note 38, at 1436-39.
84. See supra Parts IX and X.
85. See id.
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XVII. THE DOUBTFUL EFFECT OF PROGRESSIVE RATES
Professor Edward J. McCaffery has written that even if some of the
returns to capital are exempted by a postpaid consumption tax, exemp-
tion occurs only if the tax has a flat rate.86 He asserts that a postpaid
consumption tax will actually reach income from capital if the tax em-
ploys progressive rates.87
Professor McCaffery's argument starts with the well-recognized equiv-
alence of prepaid and postpaid consumption taxes that employ an identi-
cal flat rate.88 Thus, it is useful to begin by thinking about a single-rate
wage tax, which is a prepaid tax because it is imposed when the wages are
earned, not when they are spent on consumption. Such a tax applies only
to wages; it expressly exempts all yields to capital89 and all consumer
purchases. Thus, a wage tax appears to be merely a narrow-base income
tax and not a form of consumption tax. But as is well-known to students
of tax policy, under certain assumptions, 90 a flat-rate wage tax actually
produces an after-tax outcome identical to that of a postpaid consump-
tion tax that has the same flat rate. This can be shown by applying the
facts of Example 1 to a scenario involving a 30% wage tax and a 30%
RST. Table 9 shows the familiar results.
TABLE 9 (TABLE 1 WITH A 30% WAGE TAX AND 30% RST)
Wage Tax RST
1/1/1 Wages $100.00 $100.00
1/1/1 Wage tax @ 30% -30.00 -0-
1/1/1 After-tax investment $ 70.00 $100.00
Interest earned @ 5% + 3.50 + 5.00
Tax on interest -0- -0-
Gross 1/1/2 amount for consumption $ 73.50 $105.00
1/1/2 Tax on flower purchase -0- -31.50
Net 1/1/2 consumption $ 73.50 $ 73.50
Table 9 demonstrates that the 30% wage tax explicitly exempts Cole's
$3.50 of interest while creating the same end result-$73.50 of net con-
sumption-as the 30% postpaid RST in Table 1. This equivalence of out-
comes is typically used to make two important points. First, the flat-rate
wage tax must be a consumption tax, rather than a narrow-base income
tax. This is so because it produces the same after-tax result as an RST
with the same flat rate, which means that it also produces the same after-
tax result as a VAT and a cash-flow tax with the same flat rate, and all
86. McCaffery, supra note 3, at 873-80.
87. See id.; see also SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 5, at 203.
88. See McCaffery, supra note 3, at 813-18.
89. See DODGE, FLEMING & GEIER, supra note 6, at 72-73; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra
note 5, at 199-200, 205.
90. See generally Graetz, supra note 6, at 1598-1602.
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three of these taxing regimes are levies on consumption.91 Second, since
the wage tax and RST (and the VAT and cash-flow tax) produce
equivalent outcomes and the wage tax explicitly exempts Cole's $3.50 of
interest, the necessary implication is that the RST and the VAT and cash-
flow tax also effectively exempt Cole's interest, 92 even though the RST
(and the VAT and cash-flow tax) appears to tax $5 of interest in the Ex-
ample 1 Table 1 when Cole pays $105 to the florist on January 1, Year 2.
According to Professor McCaffery, however, if a postpaid consumption
tax has progressive rates, the equivalence of prepaid and postpaid con-
sumption taxes dissolves, and the progressive postpaid consumption tax
will apply to capital income when a spike in the taxpayer's consumer
spending pushes her into a higher tax bracket. 93 But the only form of
postpaid consumption tax that can employ progressive rates is a cash-flow
tax. 94 Thus, to test Professor McCaffery's assertion within the context of
the examples used in this article, I must again temporarily alter Example
1 by stipulating that the consumption tax involved there is a cash-flow tax
that employs progressive rates, say 30% on the first $100 of consumption
and 50% on amounts above $100. Table 10 reformulates the Table 1 RST
scenario to reflect these changes.
TABLE 10 (TABLE 1 WITH A PROGRESSIVE CASH-FLOW TAX)
1/1/1 Wages $100.00
1/1/1 Tax -0- 95
1/1/1 After-tax investment $100.00
Interest earned @ 5% + 5.00
Gross 1/1/2 amount for consumption $105.00
Tax on first $100 @ 30% $30.00
Tax on next $5 @ 50% + 2.50
Total 1/1/2 cash-flow tax - 32.50
Net 1/1/2 consumption $ 72.50
Table 10 shows that on the stated facts, the progressive cash-flow tax
rate schedule raises $1 more tax ($32.50) than did the flat rate RST in
Table 1 ($31.50). Moreover, the 50% marginal rate became applicable in
Table 10 because Cole consumed the $5 of interest. Thus, the twenty
point difference between the 30% rate and the 50% rate arguably falls
entirely on interest income96 and it appears that, as predicted by Profes-
91. See DODGE, FLEMING & GEIER, supra note 6, at 68-73; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra
note 5, at 199-200.
92. See DODGE, FLEMING & GEIER, supra note 6, at 75; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra
note 5, at 199; Andrews, supra note 11, at 1126; Avi-Yonah, supra note 4, at 1658.
93. See McCaffery, supra note 3, at 813-18, 873-880; see also, Alstott, supra note 33.
94. See Graetz, supra note 6, at 1578-79.
95. A cash-flow tax requires Cole to include his $100 of wages in the tax base but
allows an offsetting $100 deduction for the contemporaneous investment in the debenture.
This deduction fully shelters the wages so that no tax is due on 1/1/1.
96. For the sake of argument, I am giving Professor McCaffery the benefit of the
doubt and proceeding on the assumption that the twenty point difference falls entirely on
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sor McCaffery, the progressive rate table caused the cash-flow regime to
impose a $1 tax on Cole's consumption of the $5 of January 1, year 2
interest.97 Taking this view, the interest bore only a 20% rate of tax ($1/
$5) compared to the 30% tax that applied in Tables 1 and 10 to Cole's
consumption of his wages, but the interest apparently did bear some tax.
The joint investor analysis, however, reaches a different conclusion.
The discussion of the government's "share" in Parts IV to X supra shows
that where the postpaid tax employs a 30% flat rate, we can regard the
government as having a 30% share of Cole's debenture investment. But
in a progressive rate scenario, the ultimate tax rate cannot be known at
the time of the investment. For previously discussed reasons, however,
the rate will surely be greater than zero.98 Thus, it is inappropriate to
regard the government as having no ex ante claim on Cole's investment
merely because the postpaid consumption tax employs progressive rates
rather than a flat rate. The better alternative is to regard the government
as having a share of Cole's debenture investment at the time the deben-
ture is purchased, just as in the flat rate scenario, 99 but to rely on hind-
sight by defining the government's share in terms of its actual take.
The government's tax take in the progressive cash-flow tax scenario
(Table 10) was 30.95% ($32.50/$105). Thus, the joint investor analysis
views the government as owning a $30.95 share of the $100 debenture and
as being entitled to $1.55 of the $5 of January 1, Year 2 interest (.3095 x
$5 = $1.55). The sum of the government's principal share ($30.95) and
interest share ($1.55) equals $32.50. This means that Cole's $32.50 cash-
flow tax payment on January 1, Year 2 was nothing more than his delivery
to the government of its $30.95 share of the $100 of debenture principal
and its $1.55 share of the interest thereon. Cole's $3.45 portion of the
interest ($5 - $1.55) did not bear any tax. Accordingly, the joint investor
analysis contradicts Professor McCaffery's argument that a postpaid con-
sumption tax with progressive rates reaches investment returns that
would escape a flat-rate postpaid tax.
This conclusion, however, depends on acceptance of the argument that
the government had a 30.95% share of Cole's investment in the deben-
ture, even though the progressive rate structure made it impossible to
know the precise amount of the government's share until Cole consumed
the investment. If that contention is unpersuasive, then Professor McCaf-
fery wins the point and the progressive cash-flow tax does impose a $1 tax
on capital income in Table 10. But more importantly, even if one rejects
the argument that the government had a 30.95% share of Cole's deben-
the interest income. It would be equally defensible, however, to assume that this differ-
ence was borne proportionally by the wages and the interest.
97. Thus, $5 interest x .20 rate difference = $1 tax. Obviously, the width of the rate
brackets is very important. If the 30% bracket in this hypothetical had ended at $105
instead of $100, then the tax would have been the same as in the RST column of Table 1
($31.50).
98. See supra Part VI.
99. See supra Part VIII.
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ture investment in Table 10, the analysis in Part VI supra demonstrates
that the government's share was at least equal to the 30% initial rate in
the progressive rate table. Thus, to that extent, even the progressive
cash-flow tax in Table 10 results in the government becoming a joint in-
vestor with Cole and presents the distributional and process concerns dis-
cussed in Part XII supra.
XVIII. THE IRRELEVANCE OF EQUIVALENCE
As explained in Part XVII supra, the equivalence of a wage tax and a
postpaid consumption tax is often used in the literature to show that a
postpaid consumption tax does not impose a tax (or a second tax100) on
investment income. However, it is well recognized that this equivalence
is destroyed if tax rates change in the period between payment of the
wage tax and payment of the postpaid consumption tax. 01 This point can
be illustrated by changing the facts of Example 1 to provide that (1) there
is a third hypothetical financing alternative for the United States Govern-
ment-a 30% wage tax, and (2) that between January 1, Year 1 and Janu-
ary 1, Year 2, the income tax and RST rates increase from 30% to 50%.
Table 11 shows the results.
TABLE 11 (TABLE 1 WITH AN INCOME TAX AND RST
RATE INCREASE)
Income Tax RST Wage Tax
1/1/1 Wages $100.00 $100.00 $100.00
1/1/1 Tax @ 30% - 30.00 -0- - 30.00
1/1/1 After-tax investment $ 70.00 $100.00 $ 70.00
Interest earned @ 5% + 3.50 + 5.00 + 3.50
1/1/2 50% income tax - 1.75 -0- -0-
Gross 1/1/2 amount for consumption $ 71.75 $105.00 $ 73.50
1/1/2 50% RST on flower purchase -0- -52.50 -0-
Net 1/1/2 consumption $ 71.75 $ 52.50 $73.50
Table l's difference in bottom lines between the income tax and the
wage tax is $1.75 ($73.50 - $71.75). This was expectable because $1.75
exactly equals the January 1, Year 2 tax that applied to the interest in the
income tax scenario but not in the wage tax scenario. Now note that the
difference between the income tax and RST bottom-lines is $19.25
($71.75 - $52.50) and that this excess of the income tax bottom-line over
the RST bottom-line equals the 20 point rate increase between the time
of the January 1, Year 1 income tax payment and the January 1, Year 2
100. See text supra notes 13-14.
101. See DODGE, FLEMING & GEIER, supra note 6, at 72; Andrews, supra note 11, at
1126; Avi-Yonah, supra note 4, at 1658; McCaffery, supra note 3, at 825. Other changes
can also destroy the equivalence, see Graetz, supra note 6, at 1598-1602, but for purposes of
this paper, it makes no difference how the equivalence is broken, and a tax rate change
provides a simple scenario within which to examine consequences.
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RST payment, minus the $1.75 January 1, Year 2 tax on the interest ([$105
x .20] - $1.75 = $19.25). Thus, even though the rate increase destroyed the
wage tax/RST equivalency, this analysis shows that the January 1, Year 2
$1.75 interest tax was avoided in the RST scenario.
Moreover, the joint investor analysis still provides the explanation for
the interest tax avoidance in Table 11 if we follow the line of argument in
Parts VI and XVII supra, and treat the RST rate increase from 30% to
50% as retroactively moving the government from a 30% joint investor
position to a 50% joint investor status. Table 12 shows the results of this
approach.
TABLE 12 (REFORMULATION OF THE RST SCENARIO
IN TABLE 11)
Cole Government Totals
1/1/1 Debenture investment $50.00 $50.00 $100.00
5% Interest for one year + 2.50 + 2.50 + 5.00
Total return on 1/1/2 $52.50 $52.50 $105.00
In other words, Table 12 shows that the government's $52.50 RST col-
lection in Table 11 was simply the government's half of the $100 invest-
ment principal plus the government's half of the investment return. The
government did not collect any tax on Cole's half of the investment
income.
More broadly, Tables 11 and 12 show that the wage tax/postpaid con-
sumption tax equivalence is unnecessary either for purposes of showing
that postpaid consumption taxes do not impose a tax (or a second tax102)
on investment returns or for purposes of explaining that result through
joint investor analysis.
XIX. JOHN STUART MILL REDUX
John Stuart Mill famously argued as follows that an income tax was
objectionable on both efficiency and fairness grounds because it taxed
savers twice while imposing only a single layer of tax on those who imme-
diately consumed all their earnings:
[T]he proper mode of assessing an income tax would be to tax only
the part of income devoted to expenditure, exempting that which is
saved. For when saved and invested (and all savings, speaking gener-
ally, are invested) it thenceforth pays income tax on the interest or
profit which it brings, notwithstanding that it has already been taxed
on the principal. Unless, therefore, savings are exempted from in-
come tax, the contributors are twice taxed on what they save, and
only once on what they spend. A person who spends all he receives,
pays 7d. in the pound, or say three per cent, to the tax, and no more;
but if he saves part of the year's income and buys stock, then in addi-
102. See supra Part III.
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tion to the three per cent which he has paid on the principal, and
which diminishes the interest in the same ratio, he pays three per
cent annually on the interest itself, which is equivalent to an immedi-
ate payment of a second three per cent on the principal. So that
while unproductive expenditure pays only three per cent, savings pay
six percent: or more correctly, three per cent on the whole, and an-
other three per cent on the remaining ninety-seven. The difference
thus created to the disadvantage of prudence and economy, is not
only impolitic but unjust. To tax the sum invested, and afterwards to
tax also the proceeds of the investment, is to tax the same portion of
the contributor's means twice over....
No income tax is really just from which savings are not
exempted ....
[Pleople should be taxed, not in proportion to what they have, but to
what they can afford to spend. 10 3
Although Mill seems to suggest that his double tax argument estab-
lishes that the income tax is unfair and, on that ground, should be re-
placed with a consumption tax, scholars have long recognized that this
gets things backwards. The income tax can be properly characterized as
imposing an unfair double tax on saving only if it is first established on
other grounds that consumption taxation is normatively correct and in-
come taxation normatively wrong. 104 This follows from the fact that if
income taxation is actually the correct approach, then income tax princi-
ples apply to Table 1, and under those principles, there is no double tax in
the income tax column of Table 1 because Cole's $3.50 of interest income
in the income tax column is a new accession to wealth'0 5 that is an appro-
priate object of income taxation, even though it was produced by invest-
ing previously taxed wages.10 6
The contrast between Tables 3 and 4 supports this argument by show-
ing that when the government took its $30 income tax on Cole's January
1, Year 1 wages, the government had no continuing investment in the
principal of Cole' debenture (Table 4), unlike the RST scenario where the
government was a $30 joint investor in the debenture (Table 3). Thus, the
initial round of income taxation was closed by Cole's $30 tax payment on
103. JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, bk. V, ch. II, § 4 (Wil-
liam J. Ashley ed., Longmans, Green & Co. 7th ed. 1909) (1848), available at http:-b',.
www.econlib.org/library/Mil/mlP64.html; see also PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED.
TAX REFORM, supra note 3, at 21, 89-90.
104. See NICHOLAS KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX 79-81 (1955); MUSGRAVE, supra
note 14, at 161-63; see also Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the Consumption Tax, 44 STAN.
L. REV. 961 (1992).
105. See Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
106. See DODGE, FLEMING & GEIER, supra note 6, at 74-75; Musgrave, supra note 14, at
162; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 5, at 28-29. Contra Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy
Case for Capital Taxation, 13 (USC CLEO Research Paper No. C05-11, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=802888 ("Mill's claim that the income tax is a double tax on sav-
ings is descriptive, an analytic fact. It is true both within the income tax's own base, where
savers are penalized vis a vis spenders, and relative to a hypothetical no-tax world.").
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January 1, Year 1 (Table 4), and if Cole had spent his $70 of after-tax
wages on consumption instead of a debenture, there would have been no
further income taxation. Cole's decision to invest the $70 of after-tax
wages in the debenture was, therefore, a new transaction, and the result-
ing interest income was a new accession to wealth that was taxable under
income tax principles. From this standpoint, an income tax imposes a
single tax on investment income and a postpaid consumption tax exempts
such income.
Of course, the preceding analysis only addresses a matter of form, not
economics. With respect to economics, there is a widely-held view that,
as seemingly illustrated in Table 1, an income tax burdens saving for fu-
ture consumption more heavily than present consumption while con-
sumption taxes are neutral between savers and present spenders. 10 7 The
income versus consumption battle must be fought out primarily on the
basis of (1) whether these differential burdens have meaningful economic
consequences, 10 8 (2) which of these two forms of taxation is superior on
ability-to-pay fairness grounds,10 9 and (3) the weight to be given to the
distributional and process insights provided above 10 by the joint investor
analysis. For this purpose, Mill's double-tax rhetoric is unhelpful as well
as misleading. 1 '
XX. CONCLUSION
There has been much recent discussion of replacing the federal income
tax with a postpaid consumption tax. The disturbing downward shift of
the yearly tax burden that could result from such a change is often noted
in the literature. 112 In this article, however, I have looked in a different
direction and attempted to show that postpaid consumption taxes make
the government a participant in private investments and that complete
substitution of a postpaid consumption tax for the federal income tax
would move the United States much further along the road to a scheme
under which the government effectively matches all private savings, with-
out any limitation and without regard to the purpose of the savings, and
107. See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 5, at 197-99; Andrews, supra note 11, at 1168-
69; McCaffery, supra note 3, at 823-24. But see DODGE, FLEMING & GEIER, supra note 6,
at 138-39 (arguing that substitution of a consumption tax for the federal income tax might
cause offsetting events that would prevent an improved outcome for savers).
108. Mill was presumably asserting that there are meaningful economic consequences
when he said, "The difference thus created to the disadvantage of prudence and economy,
is ... impolitic." MILL, supra note 103, at § 4. But see DODGE, FLEMING & GEIER, supra
note 6, at 138-43; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 5, at 127-31; Gregg A. Esenwein, Federal
Tax Reform and Its Potential Effects on Saving, 110 TAX NOTES 759, 761-62 (2006) (all
suggesting that reducing the tax burden on saving will not necessarily cause saving to
increase).
109. See DODGE, FLEMING & GEIER, supra note 6, at 137-38 (the ability-to-pay norm
favors income taxation).
110. See supra Part XII.
111. See also Warren, supra note 33, at 15.
112. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, supra note 3, at
207-11, 222; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 5, at 256-64.
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gives the largest match to the wealthiest taxpayers. I have also attempted
to show that this insight serves as a useful lens through which to scrutinize
other facets of the income tax versus consumption tax debate and that
this scrutiny shows, among other things, that a postpaid consumption tax
with progressive rates arguably does not impose any greater burden on
investment income than a flat-rate postpaid consumption tax, that the
wage tax/postpaid consumption tax equivalence is not essential to an un-
derstanding of the effects of a postpaid consumption tax, and that within
its premises, the income tax does not double-tax investment income.
